for Wellbe, LLC · August 2026The app is effectively complete and the backoffice is live in production, but it has not been formally taken to market yet - deliberately, and on your call. What this document is about is what happens when it is. Recruiting the first clinics and putting the first patients in front of them is a different job from building the platform, and it needs someone whose whole week is pointed at it.
Clinician supply first, patient demand second, and the gate between them is density - not a date. A patient who searches a metro with four clinics in it gets a bad answer, uninstalls, and is gone for good - a download you only get once, spent on an empty result. Density is what turns that risk off.
And density is measured per care area, per metro - because people look for care where they live. Somebody in Memphis needing a scan will not use a marketplace that is strong in Denver, so a national install count means nothing. What means something is one procedure, in one city, with enough places to choose between.
So patient marketing stays switched off until a specific care area in a specific metro clears a threshold you set together in the first month. Then it goes on hard for that pairing - creators, a research article and a cost-of-care press release, all naming the service and the city - and moves to the next pairing as it fills.
Run patient acquisition nationally, or in any metro that hasn't cleared the density bar. Paid traffic into a thin marketplace buys uninstalls, and the six-month clinician trial means you'd be paying to fill a market that isn't earning yet either.
Pick one metro. Fill it with clinicians using outbound and partnerships, which are the two channels that work at low volume against a list you can name. Then open the demand channels in that one metro and let it become the template for the next one.
The named list of every practice in the first metro worth contacting, and the tracking that ties what gets spent to the clinics that actually sign.
Recruiting runs against that list and against the organizations those practices already trust. Care area by care area, the market gets dense enough to be worth showing to patients.
Patient demand opens where a market is genuinely full. The method that got it there is then known rather than guessed at, and it gets pointed at the next metro.
Start in one area and treat it as an experiment. Find what recruits clinicians there, then what brings patients in behind them. Take what worked and run it again in the next area, with what the first one taught you.
The specific plays behind each stage are in What we'd run first, and what each of them costs in team time is on Build your team.
The same way every seat on your team is billed. No percentage of your ad budget and no management fee stacked on media spend - an agency paid a slice of your spend has a reason to tell you to spend more, and your engineer doesn't.
It enters with a number attached and a result that would tell us to kill it. When the number comes back the channel either scales or shuts off, and the budget moves.
A channel you have ruled out is worth nearly as much as one you have found. Both tell you where the next dollar should go.
No advertising budget is proposed here. Paid channels are deliberately the last ones to open, and what you spend gets set with you in the first month against your own economics - what a subscribed clinic is worth, and what you are willing to pay to get one. The only spend you are committing to here is the person.
Before anything ships we say what we expect it to do, and we name the result that would tell us to stop.
One hypothesis per variant, so a result points at a cause instead of at a guess.
Every stage of the funnel has one governing number, agreed at the start rather than chosen afterwards to suit the result.
What clears the bar gets more budget. What doesn't gets stopped, and the money moves to whatever is working.
"The whole job is deciding who we bother."
A list short enough to defend name by name, researched one company at a time, then reached through whichever door that person would actually answer - email, a call, a message, sometimes something that arrives in the post.
Earns a slot when you can describe your buyer precisely enough to build a list of them by name. Judged on real conversations with people who match that description, never on opens or clicks. The honest limit: it cannot fix timing - you are arriving on your schedule, not theirs.
"Be a helper, not a shark in the lobby."
Rank the organizations that already have your buyer's attention, show up as a useful participant rather than as an advertisement, then build something together worth their audience's time.
Earns a slot when your buyers already gather somewhere and somebody else is already trusted in that room. Judged on partner-sourced conversations, on a longer window than any other channel. The honest limit: it is slow, and a room you burn is closed for good.
"A gate is a decision with a price on it."
Lead magnets people actually use, guides that finish the question, research nobody else has, webinars you own the list from, and placement in the publications your buyers already read.
Earns a slot when there is an argument your market keeps having without data behind it. Judged on named people per asset, not pageviews. The honest limit: the volume is small by design, and part of the timeline belongs to an editor.
"You can't train ChatGPT."
Start from what people actually type, put the answer where an assistant can lift it and name you, publish on a fixed cadence, and re-ask the same questions every month to watch the answer move.
Earns a slot when people are already searching for what you do. Judged on new users and which pages get cited, by engine. The honest limit: it takes a quarter to read - and it is the only channel still working a year after it is paid for.
"The platform will always tell you it worked."
Instrument the funnel inside the product before a single click is bought, then change one thing at a time - the visual, the copy, the page, the offer - each running its full window before anyone calls it.
Earns a slot when you already know who your buyer is and want to find out quickly whether your message moves them. Judged on cost per paying customer, never cost per lead. The honest limit: it stops the day you stop paying.
"Followers are the number that never comes back."
Two or three platforms rather than all of them, a calendar planned a month out, and everything else the plan produces given a second life here.
Earns a slot when you have something worth amplifying and somebody willing to put their name to an opinion. Judged on who subscribed and who was reading, never on follower count. The honest limit: it rarely shows up as an attributable lead source.
A named primary and secondary buyer, and the proof behind every claim you make to them, so every experiment after that points at somebody specific.
The registries, associations and communities your buyers gather in, ranked, each with a route in. Events get judged on the same terms as every other channel.
Cost to serve, contribution per sale, and the ceiling any acquisition cost has to stay under. It is the number every experiment gets judged against.
A prospect list built out of that map and enriched, living in your accounts with a documented way to refresh it.
Tracking codes for every channel and asset, wired through to your CRM, so a click can be followed to a customer rather than guessed at.
Every experiment closes with a number instead of an opinion - including the ones that did not work.
Outbound, partnerships and original research come first, because the people you need are a finite list you can name. Search and social follow on the patient side once a market is full. Paid media is deliberately not on the list - it does not recruit clinics, and pointing it at a thin marketplace buys uninstalls.
The national provider registry lists every clinician and organization in the country with a specialty code and a practice address, state boards confirm who is still active, and federal facility files cover imaging and surgical centers. That is the spine of the list, and it costs nothing but the time to assemble it.
The ones worth contacting are the practices whose economics already depend on patients paying directly - direct-care and membership practices, cash-pay specialists, independent imaging, surgical centers. Those are separately listed in direct-care directories and free-market medical association rosters, which is where the first pass of the list comes from.
Cash-pay orientation, practice size against the plan you actually sell, specialty, and whether they publish any prices today. Size matters more than it looks: the Basic plan is shaped around a single clinic with a few clinicians, so solo and small practices are the cleanest fit and larger groups are worth sizing on their own terms.
Decide up front how many clinicians across how many specialties a metro needs before a patient search returns a real answer. That number turns an open-ended recruiting effort into a target you can burn down and report against every week.
Most marketing starts by guessing who might be interested. Here you can skip that, because the population is finite and public - every practice that could be on WZRD in a given city can be named before anyone is contacted. Find the finite population, score it, work it one name at a time, and don't invite patients in until the supply side is worth showing them.
Hospitals are federally required to publish machine-readable price files, and independent facilities increasingly post cash rates. Pull one city and a handful of common procedures, and the gap between the cheapest and the dearest provider for the same scan is routinely several times over.
To a patient it is the argument the product exists to make. To an independent clinic that prices well it is proof they beat the hospital down the road, and the research becomes the outbound message rather than something sitting next to it.
"We measured what this procedure costs across your market. You are well below the regional average and none of your patients can see that." That is a message a practice manager reads, and it cannot be sent to ten thousand strangers. The list gets cut until every name left on it could receive one.
Clinics that want to be in the next edition ask to be included, which turns a study into an inbound queue. It also earns local and trade coverage, which is reach on both sides of the marketplace that no advertising buys.
Each clinic gets a message built from what was found about it, reached through whichever door a practice manager actually answers - email, a call, a message to the person who runs the office rather than the clinician who owns it.
The read: conversations with practices that match the profile. Opens and clicks decide who hears from you next and never count as a result on their own.
Free-market and direct-care associations, state medical and osteopathic societies, medical billing companies and practice-management consultants who already sell into exactly these practices. One relationship can carry a dozen clinics, which is a very different curve from contacting them one at a time.
The read: a longer window than any other channel, with the same hard stop. A partner that is going to be a dud is usually clear by month three.
The moment a practice says yes, somebody has to enter their services and prices. Doing that with them is what turns interest into a listing patients can actually find.
A monthly note showing the searches that surfaced them, profile views and calls placed. It is what turns the conversation at the end of the free trial, when a clinic decides whether to start paying, into a report rather than an ask.
The eighth-highest uninsured rate in the country, with 210 listed direct-pay providers clustered around Jackson, Ridgeland and the Gulf coast. Cash-pay is not a positioning choice here - it is the condition of the patient walking in. Fifty-seven providers in one city is a list short enough to work name by name.
Where American healthcare businesses are headquartered and talked about. A room there is worth more than the practices in it, because what happens there travels. Running it second means Nashville hears evidence instead of a plan.
Product Owner halftime, a backend and a frontend developer full-time, quality assurance halftime and a designer at 25% - $30,625 a month. Every configuration on this page is measured against that number.
| Configuration | Team | Per month | vs today | The plan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base case designer off, growth on |
PO 50% · Backend 100% · Frontend 100% · QA 50% · GTM 100% | $37,625 | +$7,000 | All 15, full pace |
| Today | PO 50% · Backend 100% · Frontend 100% · QA 50% · Designer 25% | $30,625 | - | No growth work at all |
| Consolidate the developers growth costs less than today |
PO 50% · Fullstack 100% · QA 50% · GTM 100% | $27,625 | −$3,000 | All 15, full pace |
| Consolidate, growth halftime | PO 50% · Fullstack 100% · QA 50% · GTM 50% | $22,875 | −$7,750 | All 15, half the pace |
Add to the team, or rebalance it. Keeping the developers as they are, taking the designer off and adding a full-time growth engineer comes to $7,000 a month more than you spend today. Consolidating the two developers into one accountable full-stack owner instead pays for that same engineer and still leaves you $3,000 a month below today's bill.
Development carries on either way. The difference is whether the growth function is funded by new budget or by the shape of the team.
The site, the social accounts, the app store listing and the mailing list are the only places in this plan where the audience is not rented from somebody else, which is why they are worth building properly before anything is spent on reach. Partnerships are the deliberate exception - borrowed trust, because a marketplace nobody has heard of cannot ask practices to publish their prices cold. Each of the five has a half that recruits clinicians and a half that brings patients in, and the patient half waits for the same density gate as everything else here. None of it is a campaign with a start date.
The page every other action sends people to - the clinic checking us out before replying, the patient arriving from a search result. Today it explains the product and collects nothing. No way to leave an email, no page that states a price, and footer links that lead nowhere. The first job is making it hold on to the traffic the rest of this plan creates.
Practice owners and operators are on LinkedIn, and they do not search for what WZRD is, so they have to be reached where they already are. There is no LinkedIn presence at all today, and the three accounts the site does link to are not WZRD's. Founder-led posting off the price research does the recruiting; creators on the patient side wait.
The store page is the only surface here that costs nothing to change and can be changed as often as we like. We take on the listing, keep it current, measure what it does, test each change against the live page, and build a review presence through NPS, SMS and the mailing lists. The audit is done and there is real ground to make up - including one change that costs nothing and outweighs everything else on the page.
The list is the one audience that survives a ranking change or a platform decision. Nothing on the site collects an address today, so there is no list to speak of. A clinician list is what keeps a "not right now" in month one reachable in month six; the patient list is collected per metro and mailed only once that metro can serve it. Push and SMS carry the same conversation to people who already installed the app.
Those four are surfaces WZRD owns outright. The fifth works the other way round - it borrows an audience somebody else spent years building.
Asking an independent practice to publish its prices is a real risk, and a marketplace it has never heard of is not the one to ask cold. Arriving through a company they already pay changes the question from "who are you" to "why is my software partner introducing you". One partner, properly worked, is the goal for the first quarter - what it buys is not reach but reference.
| Action | Runs from week one | Waits for the density bar |
|---|---|---|
| Website | Email capture, the clinician route off the homepage, the first price pages | Paid search on procedure and cost terms |
| Social Media | Claiming the accounts, then founder-led posting two or three times a week | Local creators, geo-fenced paid social |
| Partnerships | The partner application, then the price report into their newsletter | Employers and their benefits brokers |
| App Store Optimization | The listing rewritten and tested, and review capture switched on | App Store Ads, once presence and traction are there |
| Email, SMS & Push | The clinician list, and push and SMS wired up inside the app | The patient list, per metro |
Nothing in the right-hand column is off the plan. It is sequenced behind the supply side rather than dropped - and the bar it waits for is clinics per care area in one metro, never a date.
The Basic plan is shaped around a single clinic. A ten-site imaging group or a surgical center chain is worth many times that, and agreeing what those cost opens a class of deal worth chasing deliberately.
Clinicians in a city know each other, and the second clinic in a care area is far easier to sign than the first. One well-known imaging center or surgical center is worth more than five anonymous ones.
The real barrier to joining is a practice manager sitting down to enter services and prices. Doing that work for the first cohort removes the reason most of them would stall.
Practice-management and medical-billing companies already sell into these practices and do not compete with you. One arrangement there puts WZRD in front of a list that took them years to build.
Self-insured employers decide once a year and take advice from a small, findable set of benefits brokers. That is a real deadline to sell against rather than an open-ended pitch.
Primary care sends patients to specialists and imaging every day, and those relationships already exist offline. Giving a joined clinic an easy way to bring the practices it already refers to turns each signup into more than one.
The recruiting work will turn up practices larger than a single clinic sooner than you expect, and the answer to what they pay is better decided in advance than in the middle of a call. It is the decision that sets how large a deal this work is allowed to produce.
Recruit clinicians metro by metro, and watch each care area fill inside each metro. The moment imaging in one city has enough facilities that a search returns a genuine answer, imaging demand opens in that city only - even if dermatology in the same city is months away, and even if imaging in the next city over has not started.
Every lever below then names the specific service and the specific city, because a claim that narrow is one the marketplace can actually keep. It is also what makes the marketing cheap: a creator, an article and a press release aimed at one procedure in one city cost a fraction of a national campaign and convert far harder, because the reader can check the claim against a clinic they can drive to.
Local voices and health-cost creators, briefed to talk about the care area that just filled rather than the app in general. A creator sending people to a search that works is worth more than one with ten times the following sending them to an empty result.
The price report for that city and that procedure, published as a real piece of work with the spread in it. It is the reason a patient believes the app is worth opening, and it is the same asset that recruited the clinics in the first place.
Local outlets cover what a scan costs in their own city, because their readers pay for it. The findings are the story and WZRD is where the story is checkable - which is coverage no advertising budget buys.
The store listing costs nothing to change, it is owned start to finish by your engineer, and it sets the ceiling on everything else. Patient-side search pages for each cleared city and procedure follow the same gate as the three levers above.
Advertising does not recruit clinics, and pointing patient spend at a thin marketplace buys uninstalls rather than users. If it opens at all it opens late, tightly bounded to a care area that has already cleared the threshold.
Company network access - where an employer's people see only that employer's negotiated doctors - is already scoped on the development roadmap. Self-insured employers in one metro are a partnership motion that brings both sides of the marketplace at once: the employees arrive as demand, and the employer's existing provider relationships arrive as supply. It is the only play here that fills both sides of the marketplace at the same time.
All five are run by the growth engineer as part of the same seat, from research the plan already produces. Designli bills for the person only - there is no percentage of media spend and no management fee on top of it. Whatever is eventually spent on media is set with you, against your own economics.
A clinic that gets an email looks the company up before replying. A patient who sees a price in a search result arrives on a page. A partner who agrees to introduce us sends people somewhere. The site is the one asset every channel depends on, and today it is built to do a single job - explain the product - when the plan needs it to do three: convince a clinician who was just contacted, answer a patient's price question well enough to rank, and keep hold of everyone who is not ready to do either yet.
The "Become a Clinician" link in the top navigation goes to a working registration page. That is the single most important link on the site for the first year of this plan, and it is currently one item in a menu on a homepage written for patients.
No signup, no waiting list, no form of any kind. A practice owner who reads the page and wants to think about it has no way to stay in touch, and we have no way to reach them again. Every visitor who is not ready to register today is lost on the spot.
The Facebook, Instagram and X icons in the footer point at those platforms' own front pages rather than at WZRD accounts. Anyone who clicks one learns the company does not have a presence there, which is worse than having no icons at all.
The headline promises transparent pricing and no page delivers a number a search engine can read. That is the gap the rest of this section fills, and it is also why the site currently ranks for nothing a patient would type.
| Patient search | Volume / month | Difficulty |
|---|---|---|
| how much does an mri cost | 9,900 | 12 |
| ct scan cost | 5,400 | 22 |
| mri cost without insurance | 2,900 | 9 |
| colonoscopy cost without insurance | 1,000 | 20 |
| cheapest mri near me | 260 | 25 |
Publish every one of those pages so a search engine can read it. Transparency behind a login is worth nothing to discovery.
The number above the fold, the range across nearby clinicians, and what drives the difference. A page that says "prices vary, contact us" ranks for nothing. This is generated from data WZRD already holds, so the pattern is built once and repeated.
The cost-of-care study for that metro is genuinely newsworthy in a way a product launch is not. One study earns coverage, coverage earns links, and links are what make the city pages rank.
Assistants cite pages that state a figure plainly and attribute it. Short, direct answers to "how much does an MRI cost without insurance in [city]" get quoted; marketing pages do not.
An empty result page ranks, gets visited once, and teaches Google the site does not answer the question. The page gets better every time a listing is added - which is exactly the compounding the rest of the plan is built around.
It is instant, it costs nothing, and it is the only surface where a practice can publish services with prices attached - the whole WZRD proposition, given away as a listing format. Almost no independent practice fills that field in.
It is what a practice manager checks after the first email. It does not need to bring anybody in; it needs to exist and look real.
A free, forty-minute, done-with-you fix of the practice's Google presence - offered whether or not they ever sign. It costs them nothing, it visibly works, and it puts our operator inside their listing, which is exactly where the WZRD listing gets built next.
Paid search follows density per care area per metro, the same gate the rest of the plan uses. Buying clicks into a city with three listings spends money teaching people the answer is not here. This is what switching it on looks like when a market has earned it, not an argument for starting now.
People searching what a scan costs are already doing what the product does. Cost per click on these terms runs around two dollars and the intent is unambiguous. Buy the exact procedure and city pairings that are genuinely covered - never the generic national term - and send every click to the page built for it rather than the homepage.
The people we need to reach do not search for what WZRD is - there is no meaningful search volume behind "list my practice" or "cash pay patients", so they cannot be captured on the way in. They have to be reached where they already are, and for practice owners and operators that is LinkedIn. A personal profile reaches them; a company page does not - brand pages earn a fraction of the organic reach of a person posting in their own voice.
The website links to Facebook, Instagram and X, and all three point at those platforms' own front pages rather than at WZRD accounts. There is no LinkedIn link at all - which is the single channel where the practice owners this plan needs actually spend attention. The first week of this work is not a campaign; it is claiming the accounts and taking down the links that lead nowhere.
What the same procedure costs across one metro, and how wide the gap is. Original numbers nobody else has assembled travel further than opinion, and every post is an advert for the report that recruits clinics.
"Won't publishing prices start a race to the bottom?" is the question every clinic owner asks privately. Answering it openly, with the evidence, does more recruiting than a pitch - and the comments are a list of exactly who is thinking about it.
Searches that surfaced them, profile views, calls placed. The same monthly number each clinic already receives, published with permission, is the most persuasive post available.
Assembling the practice universe, choosing a launch market, what the density threshold is and why. Operators follow other operators building something; it costs nothing to show the work.
Drafted, sourced and scheduled by the growth engineer from research they are already doing, then edited into the founder's own words before it goes out. First person, specific numbers, no brand voice. The posture that works here is an operator thinking out loud, not a company announcing.
Consistency beats volume on this channel and the compounding is slow - assume a quarter before it produces conversations. It is cheap enough to run alongside everything else, which is the only reason it survives that wait.
Whoever comments, reacts or follows from a target practice is warmer than any cold name. Post, then comment, then message - the sequence is the point, and it feeds the same scored list the outbound plays work from.
Connection requests from practices that match the profile, replies, and meetings booked. Views and likes decide what to write next and never count as a result on their own.
People who already talk about what care costs, in the metro that has opened, pointed only at the care areas that are genuinely covered. A creator who sends people to an empty result costs more than they bring, so the brief is a list of what is actually there.
A local spread between the cheapest and dearest provider for the same scan is the post that travels on the patient side. It is the same research the clinician-facing posts run on, which is why this channel costs a brief rather than a budget.
Paid media does not recruit clinics, and pointing it at a thin marketplace buys uninstalls - a download you only get once, spent on an empty result. Measurement has to reach a booked appointment before the first dollar goes out, not after.
Not "Tennessee" - the Jackson to Ridgeland corridor and the Nashville, Brentwood and Franklin belt, targeted at practice managers, across the weeks either side of a market opening. This is the one paid line that runs on the supply side, and it runs against a named list rather than an audience.
Somebody who looked up a cost and left is the warmest audience the product has. Cheap, small, and the first place spend should scale.
Consistent with the rest of this document: Designli bills for the person only. There is no percentage of media spend and no management fee on top of it. Whatever is spent on media is set with you, against your own economics.
Name a clinic's prices as a gotcha, or publish any practice's numbers without their agreement. The argument is about opacity as a system, never about a named clinic - and one post breaking that rule costs more recruiting than the channel earns in a year.
Keep it to what can be evidenced. Every claim about what something costs should be traceable to a published price file or a listing, because the audience includes the people who set those prices and will know immediately.
We need one partner to start, and the reason is credibility. WZRD is asking independent practices to publish their prices - a genuine risk, requested by a marketplace they have never heard of. That is a hard ask cold, and no amount of outbound volume fixes it. Arriving through a company they already pay changes the question from "who are you" to "why is my software partner introducing you", which is a question that gets answered in a meeting rather than deleted.
A platform these clinics already pay for - the kind of tool that runs the business day to day. Their customer list is the list, which means no qualifying work and no cold introduction.
Same buyer, different product, nothing overlapping. A partner who could plausibly build a marketplace themselves is a competitor waiting to happen, not a route to market.
Their practices sell labs, imaging and procedures with no way to make any of it shoppable. The introduction has to be worth making from their side, or it never gets made twice.
A newsletter, a partner directory, a co-branded page, an event. If the formats already exist we are asking to be in them rather than inventing something they have never done.
Not reach - reference. The first partner is what makes the second conversation easier, and what turns the outbound email from a cold pitch into a warm introduction. It is also the fastest way to learn what practices object to, because the objections arrive through somebody they trust enough to say it out loud.
Newsletter, a co-branded page, the community, a webinar slot, then a session at the annual conference. Most of it is included in the partner programme rather than bought, which is the point of going through a partner at all.
Nothing is written specially for a partner. The metro price study that recruits clinics directly is the same thing that earns a place in their newsletter, because it tells their customers something about their own market they did not know.
A partner opens the door once. What happens next is ours: the practice lands on a page, gets a Visibility Check, and goes onto the list. A partnership that is not wired into the outbound work produces a spike and then nothing.
A warm introduction that ends in a practice manager staring at an empty listing form has not produced anything. The first cohort from a partner gets their listing built with them, same as every other route in.
Reply rate is read in exposed against unexposed zip codes, so the partner's effect can be separated from everything else running at the same time. Never impressions or cost per lead - neither survives contact with a marketplace that needs supply, not awareness. The honest test of a partnership is whether the clinics it brought are still listed three months later.
Practice-management and medical-billing companies sell into these practices already and do not compete with WZRD. Their vetting is slow, which is exactly why the application goes in during week one - it is the critical path on the whole launch.
Self-insured employers bring patients as well as providers, so that motion belongs with the patient side and waits for the same density bar. It is set out in full on the Overview, under where the bigger business deals are.
Sign a list of ten and service none of them, or take a partner who could build a marketplace themselves. Do not accept a logo swap with nothing behind it - a directory entry nobody reads is not a partnership, and it costs the same meetings to maintain as a real one.
Agree what gets measured before anything is announced, and agree what happens to the relationship if the first co-send produces nothing. One partner, properly worked, is the whole goal for the first quarter - the second is easier precisely because the first one can be named.
Everything a patient sees before they install sits on one page - what the app is called, what it says it does, how it looks and what other people have said about it. It is also the only surface in this plan that costs nothing to change and can be changed as often as we like, which makes it the cheapest place in the whole product to find growth. We take the listing on as a standing piece of work rather than a launch task.
How the app is named, described and categorised, written against what people actually type when they are looking for what it does - rather than against what the company calls itself internally. This is where most of the available ground is.
A store page goes stale. It changes with each release, each new care area that fills, and each move a competitor makes. Set once and forgotten is how most listings end up, and it is why the ones that get maintained pull ahead without spending anything.
How many people see the listing, how many open it, how many install, and how many of those reach a booked appointment. Each step is a different problem with a different fix, and without the numbers there is no way to tell which one is costing you.
Apple lets a listing be run against itself, so a change can be proven before it ships to everybody. Every change becomes a test with a result, and the page improves on evidence instead of on opinion.
Ratings are read before the description and they feed how the store ranks an app, so the listing work has a ceiling until there is a body of them. Nobody leaves a review unprompted - they leave one when they are asked, at a moment they are pleased, through a channel they were already using. All three of those have to be true at once, which is why this is a system and not a pop-up.
A short NPS question at the point somebody has actually got what they came for - a real price for a real procedure near them. The people who answer well are routed to the store; the ones who do not are asked what went wrong instead, which keeps the bad experience in a conversation with you rather than on a public page.
Healthcare is one of the few categories where a text is expected rather than resented, and it arrives after the part that actually earns a review - the visit and the bill matching what was quoted. It reaches people who have already closed the app and would never see a prompt inside it.
The patient list for a metro that has opened, and the clinician list, both reach people with existing goodwill. An ask inside something somebody chose to receive performs better than any interruption, and it costs nothing on top of a send that was going out anyway.
Volume with a falling average is worse than no reviews at all. The target is a steady rate of genuine ones and an average that holds, alongside what the reviews actually say - which is the cheapest product feedback available anywhere in this plan.
Buy reviews, incentivise them, or prompt only the people you already know are happy in a way that hides the rest. Apple removes what it detects and it puts the listing itself at risk. And never put anything identifying a patient or their care into an SMS or an email.
Ask everyone, at the right moment, and route the unhappy ones somewhere they can be answered. A four-point-something average built honestly outperforms a five that nobody believes - and it is the only version that survives someone reading the reviews properly.
There is meaningful ground to make up, both in how the app gets found and in the signals that decide whether somebody who reaches the page actually installs. One of the changes costs nothing and matters more than everything else on the page put together. The findings are written up and ready to act on in the first week.
A download is easy to buy and easy to waste. The number that counts is how many people who installed went on to look up a real price and book against it - which is also the only measure that tells you whether the listing is attracting the right people rather than just more of them.
A listing that converts and a body of genuine reviews sitting behind it. This is the part ads cannot substitute for - paying to send people to a page that does not close them wastes every click, and does it at scale.
Enough installs, and enough measurement behind them, to know who converts and who does not. That is what lets spend be aimed at the searches worth buying rather than spread across the category.
A metro that has cleared its density bar, so a search inside the app returns a real answer when the new arrival runs one. The same gate the rest of the plan uses, applied to the last channel to switch on.
People searching the store for what this app does have already decided they want it, which is why the economics here beat every other paid option once the groundwork is in. It is the channel most worth scaling, and the one that punishes starting early hardest.
Every other channel here is rented. A search ranking moves, a platform changes what it shows, a partner's newsletter is somebody else's decision. A list of practice owners who agreed to hear from you is the one asset that survives all of that - and it is the cheapest way to stay present with a clinic across the months between "not right now" and a signature.
No newsletter signup, no waiting list, no form of any kind on wzrdcare.com. Every practice owner who reads the page and is not ready to register that day leaves without a trace, and every patient who arrives early to a metro that has not opened yet cannot be told when it does. A capture form is the smallest change on this page and the one that starts compounding first, because nothing else here works until there is somewhere for the names to go.
Everyone the outbound work touches who did not say no: the practices that opened an email, took a Visibility Check, or downloaded a price report. This list runs from the first week and is the reason a "not right now" in month one is still reachable in month six. It is outbound's memory.
People who searched a price on a city page before there was enough supply to answer them. They are collected from the first day the page is live and mailed only when their metro clears its density bar - one message saying the thing they looked for is now there. Mailing them earlier spends the only goodwill the list has.
The same study that runs the outbound, the posts and the press. It is the one thing a practice owner opens without being asked twice, because it tells them what their neighbours charge.
Searches that surfaced them, profile views, calls placed. Sent to the clinics who listed it is a service; forwarded to the ones who have not, with permission, it is the most persuasive recruiting document available.
The race-to-the-bottom question needs more room than a post gives it. Email is where the long version goes, and replies to it are the warmest leads the channel produces.
Monthly is enough and survivable alongside everything else. An irregular newsletter is worse than none - it trains people that the sender is not serious, and the unsubscribe arrives with the second surprise.
The app knows which procedure somebody searched and left without booking. A clinic listing that procedure in their city, or a price moving in their favour, is a real reason to send a notification. Anything else trains people to switch them off - and a push permission, once refused, is close to impossible to win back.
A booking confirmation, a reminder before the appointment, the follow-up after it. Healthcare is one of the few categories where a text is expected rather than resented, and it reaches people who have long since closed the app. It also carries the review ask set out under App Store Optimization.
Not on first launch, before anybody knows what the app is for. The ask lands once somebody has got a real price for a real procedure near them - the same moment that earns a review, because it is the first point at which the app has visibly worked.
Email, push, SMS and the in-app prompt are the same conversation with the same person. One message per thing that happened, on whichever channel that person actually responds to - somebody who just got a text does not also need a push and an email about it.
Anything that promotes a care area only goes to people in a metro where that care area has cleared its density bar. A notification about imaging, sent to a city with two imaging clinics, is how an install becomes an uninstall. Transactional messages - a confirmation, a reminder - are never gated, because those are the product working rather than marketing.
The platforms these clinics already pay for run newsletters, partner directories and co-branded pages, and most of it is included in a partner programme rather than bought. Getting the price report into one of those is worth more than a year of building our own list, and it is how the first few hundred names arrive already warm. Our own list is what we keep afterwards.
Buy a list, scrape one, or move a cold outbound contact onto the newsletter because they did not reply. Cold outreach and a subscribed list are different permissions and mixing them puts the sending domain at risk - which takes the outbound channel down with it. And never put anything that identifies a patient or their care into an email, a text or a push - a notification preview shows on a locked screen that other people can see.
Collect every address with a stated reason and an unsubscribe that works. Judge the channel on replies and meetings booked, never on opens - open rates stopped being measurable when Apple started pre-loading images, and reporting them would be reporting noise. Texts get explicit consent and a working stop word, and nothing marketing goes out overnight.